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LAW REFORM AND LEGAL POLICY 
IN CANADA 
 
H. Patrick Glenn 
Peter M. Laing Professor of Law 
Faculty of Law & Institute of Comparative Law 
McGill University 
 
It is a great pleasure to be in Trier and to be able to participate in the work of the recently-
founded Trier Institut für Rechtspolitik. Its projected programme is very interesting and I am 
very grateful to Professors von Hoffmann and Robbers for the invitation to be with you this 
evening. 
The Trier Institut für Rechtspolitik is a university-centred institute with a broad mandate in the 
formulation of legal policy and law reform. It will deal with issues in both public and private 
law and will serve a constituency both within and without the university. In Canada we have 
no directly equivalent institution and the Trier model is therefore of great interest. The Cana-
dian experience with law reform institutions, as I will indicate, has been mixed, and it may 
well be the case that the Institute you have created represents the best means of collaboration 
between governments and Rechtswissenschaft. 
Let me first say a few words on the context of legal reform in Canada, before turning to the 
various modes of law reform with which we have experimented over the last half-century.  
I. The context of law reform in Canada. 
Legal institutions in Canada have been profoundly influenced by the English common-law 
model, even in my civil law jurisdiction of Quebec. To the extent a law reform movement has 
therefore existed in Canada, it has been largely shaped by common law history and similar 
movements elsewhere in the common law world. This may be seen as both favourable to a 
law reform movement and ultimately prejudicial to it. 
The notion of law re-form has not been inherent in the common law tradition. For the first 
eight centuries of its existence the common law consisted of a curious combination of local, 
unwritten custom and procedural rules which integrated local custom into royal courts.1 The 
common law judges did not make law (the notion of judicial law-making became current only 
in the 19th century with the development of the notion of stare decisis, a response to the 19th 
century continental codes) and the judicial role was essentially one of supervision of access to 
local juries. The common law, whatever it was, was therefore not substantive, formal law. It 
was wraith-like. It was "secreted in the interstices of procedure," in the famous phrase of 
                                                 
1 See H. P. Glenn, "La civilisation de la common law," Rev. int. dr. comp. 1993.559. 
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Maine.2 Custom and the slow accretion of precedent (a form of custom) being at the heart of 
it, it was not possible to act affirmatively, and positively, to re-form it, in any decisive way. 
One could only add, incrementally, to its base of information. 
This basic set of circumstances did not prevent efforts to legislate, though in private law the 
efforts were few indeed, and often dominated by considerations of royal revenue. Legislation 
was often seen, moreover, as articulation of that which was already law, so the notion of 
legislative change was not one which was entirely accepted. Still, the Statute of Quia Emp-
tores in 1290 succeeded in commodifying land, abolishing the old process of sub-infeudation 
in which each transfer of land simply added a new layer of feudal obligations. The Statute of 
Wills of 1540 brought about testamentary succession to land. The Statute of Frauds of 1677, 
usually said to be borrowed from French legislation, established requirements of writing for 
certain contracts. Yet the limits of legislative activity are perhaps best illustrated by the Statute 
of Uses of 1535, which attempted to eliminate the predecessor to the trust. Why did some stat-
utes succeed and others fail? It depended in large measure on the judges, and as their role as a 
source of law grew in importance, this became more and more clearly recognized in rules of 
statutory interpretation. Legislation was to be given its plain meaning and legislative intention 
could not be pursued beyond the words of the law. The words of the law, moreover, had to be 
given meaning, through the accretion of judicial interpretation. Entire volumes were therefore 
published, and continue to be published, of "words judicially considered," that is to say of the 
meaning given by judges to legislation which, by itself, is taken to have no essential meaning 
until judicial consideration has occurred. This was the position which had been reached by 
mid-twentieth century in common law jurisdictions. Legislation was becoming widespread, 
but notions of judicial supremacy and stare decisis (which by then had developed) still pre-
vented any broad programme of law reform. 
In the second half of the twentieth century a number of shifts in law-making authority oc-
curred. Legislation, under popular pressure, became more ambitious and, more significantly, 
its style of drafting changed. From the precise, defensive, style of drafting of the common law 
tradition, there was movement to more purposive statements, simpler language, and inclusion 
of preambles declarative of legislative intent.3 The judiciary, collaborating in some measure 
with these legislative developments, drew back some of the more radical features of the doc-
trine of stare decisis, notably the principle that a supreme court or court of appeal was bound 
by its own decisions, and also developed more purposive forms of legislative interpretation.4 
Finally, to take advantage of these new opportunities, ministries of justice created formal, 
governmental institutions of law reform whose purpose was to plan and prepare more ambi-
tious and effective legislative measures. It is in this sense that the common law tradition can 
be seen as favourable to the law reform movement, in institutionalized form. From the per-
spective of legislative activity, there was so much to be done, so much need, that the normal 
legislative process had to be complemented, reinforced, by formal, new agencies which would 
provide the necessary impetus. The new law reform agencies, it should be noted, were gener-
ally governmental agencies, subject to ministerial responsibility and governmental budgets. 
                                                 
2 H. S. Maine, Dissertations on Early Law and Custom: lectures delivered at Oxford (London: John 
Murray, 1883) at 389. 
3 See W. Dale, Legislative Drafting (London: Butterworths, 1977).  
4 See H. P. Glenn, "The Common Law in Canada" (1995) 74 Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 271. 
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The common law judiciary, while collaborating in some measure with these developments, 
has itself been subject to new developments, notably the growth in enactment of Bills or Char-
ters of fundamental rights. This process has now occurred, following the U.S. model, in vari-
ous modes in Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. So at a time of increasing judi-
cial deference to legislation, the judiciary also became the repository of constitional review of 
legislation. The judiciary became the source of radical re-form of the law, through over-
turning of both recent legislative attempts at law reform and also long-standing law judged no 
longer responsive to modern needs. This re-invigoration of the common law tradition has cast 
a long shadow over the institutionalized law reform movement. It had its own problems of 
context, and now had to face a major new source of legal innovation. 
As a civil law jurisdiction in a country dominated by common law thinking Quebec, however, 
has maintained in some measure a distinctive profile. The Quebec judiciary is essentially a 
common law judiciary, with the same conditions of appointment and tenure as elsewhere in 
the country, and Quebec procedure is now largely faithful to a North American, adversarial 
model. The Quebec codes, however, have been the object of constant attention. The Civil 
Code of 1866 was the object of a major effort of re-codification which came into force in 
1994; the Code of Civil Procedure, also of the nineteenth century, is now undergoing its third 
major revision. Legislation, particularly in codified form, thus occupies a more commanding 
position than in the common law provinces; its amendment and re-form is seen more as a 
normal legislative process. Quebec has thus known an Office of Revision of the Civil Code, 
and a commission for the revision of the Code of Civil Procedure, but has as yet not followed 
the common law model of governmental law reform commissions. It is now quite possible, 
given the history of these commissions, that it will never do so. What does the history of the 
law reform movement tell us about reforming the law? 
II. The law reform movement in Canada. 
Given the historical context of the law reform movement, in common law jurisdictions, it is 
not surprising that there have been major differences of opinion as to the best means of its 
implementation. There have therefore been institutional differences from jurisdiction to juris-
diction; more importantly, there have also been major differences of philosophy in terms of 
the programme of work of the various law reform commissions. These may be described, with 
no pretensions to scientific accuracy, as giving rise to three distinct concepts of law reform: i) 
the pre-modern; ii) the modern; and iii) the post-modern. 
i. The pre-modern concept of law reform 
Pre-modern attitudes to law reform are those which continue, reflected in law reform pro-
grammes, long-standing attitudes of the common law. This has been referred to, by an Austra-
lian author, as "historical pessimism à la Savigny,"5 and the New South Wales Law Commis-
sion once actually recommended repeal of that state's Defamation Act in favour of reversion 
to the common law.6 Elsewhere legislation was conceived as fulfilling a more positive func-
tion, but nevertheless a very limited one. A former Director of the Alberta Law Reform Insti-
tute has stated that Canadian provincial law reform commissions "reflected the virtues and 
deficiencies of common lawyers," in that they "tended to take pragmatic approaches to law", 
                                                 
5 G. Sawer, "The Legal Theory of Law Reform" (1970) 20 U. Toronto L.J. 183 at 187. 
6 Ibid. 
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and " have tended to be dubious about the wisdom of wide-ranging schemes for reform, how-
ever attractive to the intellect...."7 This limited concept of the role of law reform agencies was 
closely linked to their initial status, since many of the early commissions were composed of 
part-time commissioners and were accorded very limited budgets.8 Ontario's commission be-
came full-time only in 1964, though this model became widespread in the immediately ensu-
ing years. 
What tasks are appropriate for a law reform agency driven by pre-modern concepts of law re-
form? Some of those undertaken by the Alberta commission were: sharing of matrimonial 
assets on dissolution of marriage (the common law not knowing matrimonial regimes until the 
late twentieth century); abolition of spousal immunity in tort; abolition of the common law 
rule that an action for wrongdoing dies with the victim; compensation for the victims of 
crime; the age of majority; the rights of expropriated land owners; criteria of civil liability of 
occupiers of land; rights of tenants against landlords; and reform of the rule against perpetui-
ties, in the law of successions.9 These are not unimportant or purely technical matters, but they 
would be seen either as issues on which a broad social consensus already existed, or which 
generated little or no public interest. The expression "lawyer's law" has been used with respect 
to some such projects. They may be seen by the general public as largely technical in charac-
ter.  
Given this limited type of mandate, it is probably accurate to say that Canadian law reform 
commissions were largely successful in fulfilling it. This inevitably led to more ambitious pro-
jects, and to a larger and more modern concept of law reform. 
ii. Modern law reform 
The full-time law reform commissions of the 1970's and 1980's had to be more ambitious than 
their part-time predecessors. It was said that "if one plays ones cards skillfully there is no need 
for a law reform commission to fight shy of highly charged social issues and certainly no need 
for it to attempt to restrict itself to `lawyers' law'."10 The new commissions were not limited to 
topics proposed by the government of the day; they could embark of their own volition on 
large projects of societal organization. 
Topics of law reform study thus became of larger import. The Ontaro Law Reform Commis-
sion undertook major studies on court organization, class actions, Sunday observance and arti-
ficial human reproduction. The Manitoba Commission made an extensive study on the regula-
tion of professions and occcupations. They thus extended their work into "areas that would not 
have been forecast by the promoters of the provincial law reform commissions as things 
which the commissions would do...."11 The work which was done, however, was invariably of 
very high quality. 
                                                 
7 W. H. Hurlburt, "The Origins and Nature of Law Reform Commissions in the Canadian Prov-
inces: A Reply to Recommending Law Reform' by Professor R. A. Macdonald" (1997) 35 Alberta 
L. Rev. 880 at 886. 
8 See generally W. H. Hurlburt, Law Reform Commissions in the United Kingdom, Australia and 
Canada (Edmonton: Juriliber, 1986). 
9 Hurlburt, supra, note 7, at 894, 895. 
10 L. C. B. Gower, "Reflections on Law Reform" (1973) 23 U. Toronto L. J. 256. 
11 Hurlburt, supra, note 7, at 897. 
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The commissions were certainly aware of the difficulties in extending their mandate. They 
developed, or attempted to develop, more sophisticated means of research and presentation. 
The "field of choice" type of report was one such innovation. Such a report did not simply 
make proposals for reform; it rather reviewed a number of various possible reforms, giving 
the arguments for and against each of them, while undertaking to draft legislation once par-
liament had decided which direction to take.12 Social research was also considered necessary. 
This was done usually through ad hoc contracting, though some commissions succeeded in 
securing funding for full-time social scientists.13 Yet the cost and time consumed by social 
surveys remained a major problem.14 
Much important legislation resulted from this more ambitious law reform work. There has 
clearly been a cost, however, in terms of the future of the law reform commissions them-
selves. At the present time, the only provincial commissions which are now fully functional 
are those of Nova Scotia and Alberta, and the Alberta Commissions has always been a univer-
sity-based, as opposed to governmental, commission. The 1990's has seen a steady process of 
abolition (Ontario, British Columbia, Manitoba, the Federal Commission) or downsizing of 
the commissions.15 This development has been given the most optimistic explanation in the 
following terms: 
... viewed objectively, the surprising thing is that any provincial government has ever tolerated 
an institution one of the principal functions of which is to engage in work that the government 
is not interested in; the independence of which is likely to lead it to give advice that the gov-
ernment finds unpalatable; and which is substantially outside the control of the government. 
That some governments continue to tolerate them and that others did so for many years is an 
indication of the strength of the underlying idea."16 
To these underlying problems must be added the general phenomonen of government budget-
cutting in recent years, and the underlying political reality that pure research has no basic po-
litical constituency. 
It is therefore possible to see the institutional law reform movement in Canada as having 
largely run its course, at least in pre-modern or modern mode. Reform of the law would thus 
ben seen as reverting to a more continental model, in which the primary responsibility is seen 
as resting with the government, aided by specific commissions if considered necessary and by 
university doctrine. The Canadian history is not yet over, however, since we are now witness-
ing a third mode of law reform, which I tentatively entitle the post-modern. 
iii. Post-modern law reform 
Technological and social change has been thought to accelerate in the 1990's, raising major 
questions about the appropriate legislative response. This circumstance, combined with the 
programme of a vigorous Federal Minister of Justice, brought about a reconsideration of the 
law reform programme in the mid-1990's in Canada, and the creation in 1997 of a new law 
                                                 
12 Gower, supra, note 10, at 265. 
13 Gower, supra, note 10, at 267 
14 Ibid. 
15 R. A. Macdonald, "Recommissioning Law Reform" (1997) 35 Alberta L. Rev. 831 at 838, 839. 
16 Hurlburt, supra, note 7, at 899. 
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reform institution, the Law Commission of Canada.17 The new Commission is leaner than 
those of its federal and provincial predecessors, with only one full-time member and a much 
smaller budget, but its programme is if anything more ambitious.18 Its enabling legislation 
provides specific objectives, which include the development of "new concepts of law, and 
new approaches to law," the development of measures to make the legal system more effi-
cient, economical and accessible, as well as stimulating "critical debate" about law through 
forging "productive networks with academic and other communities."19 The new Commision 
is to receive specific governmental mandates (its first has been to examine physical and sexual 
abuse of children) and it is required to adopt a long-term Strategic Agenda and its own annual 
programme of study. With its first Strategic Agenda the Commission has chosen the notion of 
relationships as its focal point, with four more specific themes of personal relationships (do-
mestic), social relationships (minorities, the poor), economic relationships (the effect of tech-
nology, new property) and governance relationships (democracy; the adversary process; cor-
porate, union or university governance). 
The new Commission is therefore meant to be inter- disciplinary and innovative in its work. 
Its President has been articulate in formulating a broad concept of law which is meant to guide 
the Commission in its deliberations and publications. He has stated that it is erroneous to be-
lieve that state legislation is the superior form of law; that "everday practices," including non-
linguistic ones, also constitute part of legal normativity; and that law reform is not the exclu-
sive domain of law reform commissions but also that of judges, lawyers and all citizens, every 
day, simply by the performance of their daily activities.20 The projected output of the Com-
mission, is designed to refect these broad objectives. In addition to recommendations to 
change legislation, the Commission also "imagines" using a variety of vehicles to "re-state" 
the law. These could include draft appellate judicial opinions, mock in-house legal memo-
randa, draft standard-form contracts and monographs, as well as documentary films, plays, 
magazines, comic books, video-games, art exhibits, commissioned pieces of music, and book 
tours.21 Reaction to this programme has not been wanting. A former provincial commission 
Director has referred to it as "very nebulous," and "beyond the powers of a small institution."22 
The Commission continues its work. 
Conclusion 
There are real risks in a programme of institutionalized, governmental law reform. The pre-
modern mode may offer too little to jusify the endeavour; the modern clearly makes govern-
ments uncomfortable; the post-modern may collapse both of its own weight and because of 
opposition to it. Paradoxically, this may be good news for a university-centered institute of 
law reform and legal policy, which is free to develop its programme and financing independ-
ently, in some measure at least, of governments. While such an institute has no direct channel 
                                                 
17 See R. A. Macdonald, "Law Reform and its Agencies" (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 99; and on the 
background to the new commission, A. Macklin, "Law Reform Error: Retry or Abort" (1993) 
16 Dalhousie L. J. 395. Annual Reports of the Commission may be found on line at 
http://www.cdc.gc.ca. 
18 Macdonald, supra, note 17, at 101. 
19 Macdonald, supra, note 17, at 102. 
20 Macdonald, supra, note 15, at 831. 
21 Macdonald, supra, note 17, at 114, 115. 
22 Hurlburt, supra, note 7, at 900, 901.  
H. Patrick Glenn – Law Reform and Legal Policy in Canada 
 9
to ensure enactment of its proposals, the Canadian experience demonstrates that the govern-
mental model also provides no guarantees in this regard. I therefore re-iterate my earlier re-
mark that the Trier Institut für Rechtspolitik represents a very interesting development, and we 
in Canada will watch its progress with interest. 
Thank you again for your invitation, and for your kind attention. 
